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Abstract
ThispaperevaluateswhethertheGermanyeconomyiscurrentlyaffectedbya
credit crunch,i.e.a supply-side restriction of loans that is not in line with mar-
ket interest rates and profitability of investment projects. With help of a dis-
equilibrium-model, we calculate a credit supply and a demand-function. We
compare estimated demand with estimated supply,finding a considerable ex-
cess-demand particularly in the second half of 2002. The main reason for this
restrictionisthedropinearningsinthebankingsector.Applyingthemodelto
Großbanken (big banks) and other credit institutions separately, shows that
the situation in the former is more severe than in the latter.
JEL:C32,E51,G21
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Revised version,September 2003.I. Introduction
After the recession 2001/2002,the economic perspectives in Germany are still
grim. Consumers’ and investors’ confidence remain low, growth is far from
satisfying and, in addition, while interest rates are quite low at the moment,
banks seem to reject their economic function: anecdotal evidence reports a
“credit crunch”and even the Bundesbank cannot deny that “the slowdown in
credit growth was somewhat stronger than in earlier periods in which the eco-
nomic climate had cooled” (Bundesbank 2002: 32). On the other hand, it
emphasises that there have been several similar situations in the past that did
not result in financial crisis,concluding “Nonetheless,the econometric results
for the various credit aggregates also show that other factors may well also be
causing weak credit growth.… By contrast,there are signs of a certain lending
restraint among banks.”(Bundesbank 2002: 45).
Of course,it is difficult to decide whether the slowing credit is still in line with
the not-so-well economic situation and cloudy business outlook in Germany,
or whether it is the beginning of a financial and economic crisis. However, if
the current situation turned out to be a credit crunch,the consequences could
be problematic: if the banks refuse to expand lending regardless of the ex-
pected yields, the private sector in Germany is cut off its most important
source of outside capital. That means that business investment will be cut
short,withthesubsequentimplicationsforthebusinesscycleandgrowth.Sec-
ondly,it implies that monetary policy looses some of its effectiveness.Any cut
in interest rates remains “stuck”in the banking sector without being transmit-
ted further into the real sphere of the economy.Therefore,one important and
powerful instrument of economic policy is – to some extent – lost.
Inthispaper,wetrytodisentanglethedifferentinfluencesonbusinessloansin
order to find evidence for or against a credit crunch in Germany.This subject
has been brought up by a study coordinated by the Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW 2002).In a survey,6000 German enterprises were asked
about the availability of credit,with the result that there is a considerable ex-
cess demand for loans,especially by small and medium firms.Two other stud-
ies (Bundesbank 2002, Sachverständigenrat 2002) both exclusively concen-
trating on demand-side factors, confirmed that credit allotment was lower
than can be explained by fundamental determinants. However, the theory of
credit markets rather sees the supply-side dominating demand (Stiglitz,Weiss
1981). We intend to trace both sides of the market, following Pazarbasioglu
(1997) and others (Ghosh,Ghosh 1999;Barajas,Steiner 2002).They apply the
conceptual framework of a disequilibrium-model allowing for conclusions on
credit market restrictions.
The paper is organised as follows:in the first part,we give an overview of the
stylised facts on business loans in Germany that led to the discussion about a
4 Hiltrud Nehls and Torsten Schmidtcredit crunch.The second section is dedicated to the presentation of the ana-
lyticalframeworkofthisstudy–adisequilibriummodel–andthedataweuse.
Inthesucceedingparttheresultsofourestimationsareshown.Inthefinalsec-
tion we provide a brief summary and conclusions.
II. Credit crunch? Economic concepts and stylised facts on credit in
Germany
There is no common definition of a “credit crunch”. In their seminal paper,
Bernanke and Lown defined it as “a significant leftward shift in the supply
curve for bank loans,holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the
quality of potential borrowers” (Bernanke, Lown 1991: 209). Anyway, Fried-
man commented (Bernanke, Lown 1991: 240) that this definition still allows
for an adjustment by higher interest rates, without some clients being com-
pletely cut off new credit. This notion does not fully coincide with the wide-
spread idea of a credit crunch as a crisis of bank lending,pushing an economy
on the edge of a recession. Without going further into detail, we therefore
adopt the concept of the “Council of Economic Advisers” saying “A credit
crunch occurs when the supply of credit is restricted below the range usually
identified with prevailing market interest rates and the profitability of invest-
ment projects.”(Council of Economic Advisers 1992: 46).1
From the banks’ point of view, reducing loans without allowing for interest
rate adjustment can be rational,though,at the first glance this might seem ab-
errant.Economictheory,however,providestwomajorconceptstoexplainthis
sort of rationing behaviour.Firstly,in the adjacent theoretical strand of mone-
tary policy transmission,this phenomenon is known as the bank lending chan-
nel(Bernanke,Blinder1980;Bernanke,Gertler1995:40f).Itsmostsimplever-
sionisastopofbanklendingfollowingregulatorychanges.Forinstance,inthe
case of the central bank demanding higher minimum reserves, loan supply
might be restrained because the bank lacks own capital. Although in the
Euro-Area and hence Germany minimum reserve requirements have lost
some relevance as an instrument of monetary policy,the Basle accords might
have a similar effect on the banks’ behaviour. The (risk-weighted) capi-
tal-to-loan-ratio, as fixed in the Basle I accord, declined significantly in many
banks due to the stock market plunge.Moreover,the rules for measuring and
weighting the risks of loans are being overhauled in the course of the Basle II
process,probably leading to significant changes in the evaluation of risks and
hence the capital requirements. One way to achieve a higher capital-to-loan-
ratio in the short run is to cut loans.
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1 For differing concepts see Ding et al.(1998).A second approach explaining the banks’ behaviour is the portfolio theory2,
according to which a bank chooses between different assets,aiming at an opti-
malmixofriskandreturn.Iftheriskcontainedintheportfoliorisesunexpect-
edly (for instance because of a weakening stock market) the whole portfolio
needstoberestructured.Inextreme,allriskyassets(includingbusinessloans),
regardless of their expected return, need to be reduced in favour of risk-free
assets.
In Germany, a strong slowdown in business loans can be observed since 2000
(Figure 1), and a downright decline since the second quarter of 2002. With a
long-run average growth rate of more than 6 % (without the time-span that is
obviously distorted by the reunification-boom,the average is still 5 ½ %),the
standarddeviationisabout2%,sothecurrentrateisobviouslyfarfrom“nor-
mal”.
Several facts support the idea of a credit crunch. In the first place, the banks
themselves cannot deny falling returns and high costs.Insisting on the non-ex-
istenceofaliquiditycrisis,theyadmitaprofitabilitycrisis(HVBCorporates&
Markets 2002: 17;Bundesverband deutscher Banken 2002: 27).The main rea-
sons are to be seen in the economic slowdown, the downturn in the financial
markets and the connected slump in investment banking,but of course,struc-
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2 For a good overview on this literature see Freixas Rochet 1998:272ff.tural shortfalls such as the large number of branches, the fragmentised bank-
ing system and the high labour costs are also likely to play a major role.What-
ever the causes are,the global rating agencies have already taken action,high-
lightingthedistressintheGermanfinancialsectorbydowngradingtheratings
for some German commercial banks in 2002. This translates into a higher
risk-premium and therefore higher capital costs.Hence,the strategy of reduc-
ing loans firstly because of the higher costs and secondly in order to limit risk
and to lift the equity ratio might be a banks’ plausible reaction.
In addition,the new standards for risk measurement set by the Basle II-agree-
ment are often quoted as an important factor for the reluctance of banks to
provide credit, even though that treaty will not be implemented earlier than
2006. With the new needs for individual risk-calculations, deficits in the ac-
counting systems of many small and medium enterprises became apparent.
Often,lackingformalfinancialstatementswereexcused,asintheGermansys-
tem of “Hausbanken” with long-run relationships between bank and cus-
tomer,the banks felt that they can rely on enough “first hand”information.In
somecasesthecloserlookintothebooksmighthavealteredthisview.Insome
cases however,Basle II might have been a welcomed excuse for cutting busi-
nessconnectionstosmall,low-potentialcustomers,eveniftheinvestmentpro-
ject would provide some positive yield.
Another fact hints into the direction of a supply-side problem (Figure 2):
disaggregating total loans by credit institutions illustrates that the slowdown
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Source:Deutsche Bundesbank.Adjusted for breaks.
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ESSENin credit expansion was far more severe in the Großbanken3 than in the other
creditinstitutes(savingsbanksetc.).Given,thattheclients’characteristicsand
demand are roughly the same in all types of banks (or,at minimum,that they
change in parallel),it appears to be rather a shift of strategy towards consoli-
dation of outstanding loans than a fall of demand. As the Großbanken suffer
most from the strong declines in the segment of investment banking and the
plummeting share prices,as they were far more involved into both,gives even
more weight to this argument.
On the other hand, the low volume of credit could also result from weak de-
mand.As mentioned above,with worsening business outlooks,the number of
profitableinvestmentprojectsdeclinesandthereforetheneedforliquidityre-
duces.AseconomicactivityinGermanyislittlemorethanstagnantsinceearly
2001, credit demand might also have weakened. However, the relatively low
interest rates and therefore low cost of credit should stimulate the demand,
hence the outcome for credit demand is ambiguous.
A second demand-side explanation could be the phenomenon of
“disintermediation”: in the recent years, firms attract more and more capital
directly on the financial markets and rely less and less on bank loans as a
source of liquidity.Indeed,in the last few years the growth rates of substitutes
for bank loans (i.e. in particular bonds) have been impressive. Anyway, the
growing importance of the bond-market could be as well consequence of the
reluctant loan-supply.In that case the quick expansion of the bond market up
until this year is a sign of undampened demand for external funds
(Westermann 2003:30ff.).
Whetherthecurrentsituationisacreditcrunchoralesssevereproblemoflow
demand,cannot be identified by examining the market results.One has to dis-
tinguish between demand-side factors and supply as neatly as possible.In or-
dertoanalysethetwosidesseparately,weusethedisequilibrium-modelthatis
described in the following section.
III. A disequilibrium-model for German credit
1. Are loans constrained by the demand or by supply?
Recent empirical investigations of the German credit market by the
Bundesbank (2002) and Sachverständigenrat (2002) identify two main deter-
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3 Following the systematics of the Deutsche Bundesbank the “Großbanken” comprise the four
big banks Deutsche Bank,Commerzbank,Dresdner Bank and Hypo Vereinsbank,as opposed to
1. Regionalbanks and other commercial banks, 2. Brances of foreign banks, 3. Land banks, 4. Sa-
vings banks, 5. Regional institutions of credit cooperatives, 6. Mortgage banks and 7. Banks with
special functions.minants of loan demand:economic activity (i.e.GDP) and financing costs (i.e.
interestratesorbanklendingrates).However,bothmayalsoaffectcreditsup-
ply, making it impossible to distinguish demand from supply effects. As both
studies precluded all methods distinguishing demand from supply, they as-
sume that actual loans are dominated by the demand-side. Hence, they iden-
tify a demand-function that represents the “explicable credit growth”. In an
error correction model,they find a discrepancy between explicable and actual
credit growth, but they can only state that irregularity, without answering
whether this is indeed a credit crunch.
In theory, however, loans are more likely to be restricted by the supply-side
(for an overview on credit rationing see Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990)). In their
seminal paper,Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks are confronted with
informationasymmetries.Thecreditorneverexertsfullcontroloveraninvest-
mentprojectandmostofthetime,he knowslessabouttheriskofdefaultthan
the debtor, leading to the problem of “moral hazard”: As soon as the loan is
granted, the debtor might choose a risky technology that, in case of success,
yields higher returns than a second, safer technology. In case of default he
looses – in these models – less than his expected return in case of success.
Therefore,for the debtor the risky project is more attractive although the ex-
pected return of the safer project may be higher. Moreover, an adverse-selec-
tionproblemexists,too.Ahighinterestratedetersthe“credible”debtorswith
low but safe returns,as with the higher costs of capital the investment project
becomes less profitable. Only those borrowers accept the high interest rate,
who expect very high returns but also a potential default.
The bank is aware that it will never achieve a correct pricing-to-risk;therefore
theonlywayofcontrollingtheexposureofitsloanportfolioiscurbingthevol-
ume of credit. As a consequence, even in equilibrium, the supply of loanable
funds does not meet demand, the interest rate does not fully reflect risk and
the supply-side dominates the demand-side.4 Hence, it seems reasonable to
examine closely the behaviour of the banking sector and the determinants of
their lending strategy.
Models on credit rationing have been examined by Kugler (1987) and by
Winker (1996)5 for (West-) Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Both studies
found substantial evidence for credit rationing and indications that sup-
ply-factors play an important role. An investigation by the IMF (2002) failed
to specify a supply equation but found a significant influence of supply side
variables in an equation with demand and supply variables.
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4 Asking for collateral does not improve the situation either,as similar adverse selection effects
mayoccur(Stiglitz,Weiss1981:408).Inaddition,onecanalsothinkofpotentialborrowersnotha-
ving enough collateral to offer.This demand for credit will always remain unsatisfied.
5 Kugler examines,apart from West Germany also the U.S.,U.K.and Switzerland.2. The model
Although in theory there is a clear difference between credit rationing and a
credit crunch – the former being an equilibrium outcome of credit markets as
a consequence of asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion, the latter representing an acute negative supply shock, resulting from a
decline of the banks’ resources or regulatory changes that is transitory – the
empirical outcome is (in the short run) the same: demand exceeds supply.
Therefore, it is not astonishing that the framework of disequilibrium models
were also applied for analysing potential credit crunches. Pazarbasioglu
(1997),GhoshandGhosh(1999)andBarajasandSteiner(2002)scrutinizethe
banklendingindifferentcountrieswithhelpofthisframework.Theyestimate
a credit demand- and a credit supply-function under the restriction that the
“shorter side” (the minimum of the two) determines the credit. This strategy
avoidstheusualidentificationproblemofequilibriummodelsaseitherthede-
mand- or the supply-function determines the volume of credit.Hence,this ap-
proachisdesignedtorevealsomeofthecausesofdecliningloans;moreover,it
allowsmakingastatementonacreditcrunch.Wethereforeadoptthismethod
in our examination. To keep the model as transparent as possible, we use the
disequilibrium model in a most simple version.We also refrain from an addi-
tional equation for the interest rate adjustment, as implemented in similar
models (Laffont, Garcia 1977, Sealey 1979, Kugler 1987, Winker 1996), be-
cause theory – as mentioned above – does not accept the interest rate as the
matching mechanism between demand and supply. The general form of the
model can be written as follows:
(1) DX v t tt =+ 11 α
(2) SX v t tt =+ 22 β
(3) () CD S tt t = min , .
WithDt ascreditdemandatthetimetS t ; ascreditsupplyintX t ; beingthere-
spective vector of determinants;vt is the respective error term andCt the ob-
served credit volume.
For the demand function, we follow the specification of the Bundesbank
(2002) and Sachverständigenrat (2002); our specification of the supply func-
tion comes close to that of Pazarbasioglu (1997) in many respects.
The function of real credit demand() Dt consists of the following equation:
(4) Daa r a yv t Cap t t =+ + + 12 3 1 ,
10 Hiltrud Nehls and Torsten Schmidtwith (rCap) being the nominal capital market rate, and (yt) real GDP. For the
former we would expect a negative sign,as with falling cost of capital,demand
should rise, for the latter, a proxy for the overall economic activity, the sign
should be positive.
Our credit supply-function is specified as follows:
(5) Sb b sb L C b c d a x b s p a n v tt t t t t =+ + + + + 12 3 4 5 2 .
In (5) real credit supply (S t) is determined by a portfolio management ap-




prices, measured by the price performance index of German shares (cdaxt)
can cause a decline in credit supply via two channels.Firstly,a decline in share
prices can reduce the net worth of borrowing firms and the collateral value
owned by borrowers.Secondly,a reduction in bank capital forces banks to in-
crease the liquidity and safety of their assets by a reduction in lending activity
(Bernanke 1995:18;Nanjo 2002:8).7 According to both interpretations,a fall-
ing cdax goes along with a slowdown in credit supply.The difference between
interest rate on business loans and the interest rate on deposits (spant) also
can be interpreted as a risk-measure.Supposing that this span is the sum of a
constant margin plus all fixed costs,including the agency costs,and supposing
that the agency costs rise with higher risk involved,an elevated span indicates
higher risks (Pazarbasioglu 1997). This notion is in line with the Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) argument of the interest rate as a “screening device”,saying that
high interest rates will often only be accepted,because the borrower’s project
is very risky,indicating a high probability of default.The expected sign for the
first three determinants is positive,the fourth negative.
Inthistypeofmodel,asecondstepisneededtoassociateaparticularobserva-
tion in time to the demand- or the supply-equation.8 To obtain an impression
of which side of the market determined the actual market result (i.e. the vol-
ume of credit) one has to compare the estimated demand and supply.If in one
period the estimated supply is smaller than the estimated demand, it is likely
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mance,therefore the CDAX is a better indicator than the banking sector share price index.Any-
way,as both of them move nearly synchronously during the 1990s,the estimation outcomes are si-
milar.
8 Other models introduce an additional assumption to assign the observations either to the de-
mand or the supply equation (for an overview see Maddala 1987).thatthecreditvolumeofthisobservationissupply-constrained.Bythismeans,
the probability that an observation is demand- or supply-constrained can be
calculated. Alternatively, graphical inspection (see below) can give useful re-
sults on whether supply or demand is “short”.
3. Data and estimation
For our analysis,we mainly relied on the sample period from 1992 to 2002,try-
ing to avoid the structural break caused by the German reunification. To get
an intuition of the robustness of our results, we also estimated the various
specifications with the sample period 1980-2002. All series we used are on
quarterly basis.
TheGermanBundesbankprovidedalldata,exceptforGDPandtheGDPde-
flator, for which the Federal Statistical Office Germany is the official source.
All series except interest rates are seasonally adjusted.As the credit variable
(C) we used total loans to enterprises and self-employed persons, deflated
with the consumer price index. The lending capacity (LC) includes sight de-
posits plus time deposits for up to one year plus the bank‘s capital, and is de-
flated with the GDP deflator.Both series are in log-form.The series of credit
volume had to be adjusted for statistical breaks. Following the Bundesbank,
the series were constructed by adding the Bundesbank’s adjusted quar-
ter-to-quarterchanges.Onlyonebreak,in1998,remainedintheseries.Forthe
equitypriceswechosetheCDAXPerformanceIndexthatincludesmorethan
750 German traded stock listings.The interest rate on credit in the current ac-
count (s) proxies the credit price.The variable span was calculated as the dif-
ference between this interest rate on credit (s) and the interest rate on depos-
its with agreed maturity up to one year.Interest rates are in nominal terms.As
an argument in the demand equation we employed the yields on bonds out-
standing issued by residents (rCap).
We used a simple form of a disequilibrium-model, estimated by maxi-
mum-likelihood.Using equations (1)–(3) and assuming that the errorsv t 1 and
v t 2 are normally independently distributed with variancesσ1
2 andσ2
2 the joint
probability density of D and S can be written as (Maddala 1987):














The two conditional probability density functions of C are
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CC |, =< = =
∞∞
∫∫ 12
(8) () () () () h C C S D g D C dD g C g D dD
CC |, =< = =
∞∞
∫∫ 21
From (7) and (8) the unconditional density of the observable credit volume
(C) then is:
() () () () () () () h C h C CD S h C C S D gC g S d S gC gD d D
CC == < += < = +
∞∞
∫∫ || 12 2 1
The associated log-likelihood function then is





To maximise (10) we used the Marquardt procedure implemented in the
Eviews-package. The starting values were calculated by an OLS-estimation.
Alternatively,we tried a two-step-estimation,its results were nearly identical.
In general,convergence was achieved with at most 20 iterations.
As all series are non-stationary,the estimation in levels only allows for an in-
terpretation of the credit demand- and supply-equations as cointegration vec-
tors. This implies that the t-statistics cannot be interpreted as a formal test of
significance.Nevertheless the standard errors provide a measure of precision
of individual estimators (Ghosh,Ghosh 1999: 11).To check on the validity of
the interpretation as cointegration vectors, we tested the credit demand and
supply for cointegration with the observed credit volume (Ghosh, Ghosh
1999).Forthispurpose,weusedtheReimerssmallsamplecorrectiontocalcu-
late the Johansen trace statistic (Reimers 1992).
IV. Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 1. All coefficients have the ex-
pected sign.9 Specification (1) relies on equations (4) and (5).The coefficients
ofthedemandequationarequiteclosetotheresultsoftheBundesbank(2002
p.38)andthestandarderrorsaresmall.Theinterestratespreadhasanegative
impact on credit supply,confirming its interpretation as a risk-measure.
In alternative calculations, (Table 1, specifications 2–4) we varied the specifi-
cations to test for robustness. First (specification 2), in the demand equation
we replaced the capital market rate by interest rates for short-term credit for
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(9)
9 The purpose of this study is to find one or two (demand or/and supply) cointegration relations
explaining loans. The interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities or semi-elasticities additio-
nally require to model of the short-run dynamics (Gonzalo 1994:206).enterprises,asitseemedtobeamoredirectmeasureofthecostofcapital.Un-
fortunately, this did not improve the results; at least, all variables kept their
sign and the magnitudes varied moderately. In a second variation (specifica-
tion 3) we tried to implement the notion of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),by disre-
garding the interest rate completely. The standard error and the likelihood
value of the supply function indicate that the overall fit declines slightly. To
gaugetheinfluenceofthesharepriceindex,inspecification(4)weexcludedit
from the supply equation, which leads to more obvious deterioration of the
overall fit.
Because of the non-stationarity of the data, we used cointegration tests for a
formal check of these specifications. Cointegration tests for specifications
(1)–(3) indicate exactly one cointegrating vector for estimated demand with
theobservedcreditvolume,andalsoexactlyonefortheestimatedsupplywith
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Estimates for different credit demand and supply functions
(Maximum likelihood estimation)





























































































Sigma 0.018 0.015 0.020 0.034 0.029
Log Likelihood 128.86 121.73 126.27 119.29 218.08




ification (4) we exclude the share price index from the supply equation.In this
case,estimatedsupplyisnolongerasclearlycointegratedwithobservedcredit
asbefore,verifyingtheimpactofsharepricesoncreditsupply.As,allinall,the
results of specification (1) are most convincing, our conclusions are drawn
from its results.
We also tried a longer sample period,beginning in the first quarter 1980.De-
spite the obvious problems connected with the structural break caused by the
German reunification, the results remained plausible.Other variables,for in-
stance the number of defaults as a risk-indicator, or the inclusion of other
credit variables gave less encouraging results.When testing a variety of differ-
ent specifications,it was interesting to notice that the demand-function of the
modelexhibitedahighdegreeofrobustness,whereasthesupplywasnotquite
as stable.Also the normality assumption of the residuals is more valid for the
demand equation than for supply.
In a next step, we interpret the difference between the calculated credit de-
mand and supply at a ratio of estimated supply, as an indicator of excess de-
mand and excess supply respectively (Figure 3). As mentioned above, credit
rationing is, to a certain extent, compatible with “normal” bank behaviour,
complicating the identification of a credit crunch.In addition,we have to bear
in mind that our calculated credit demand and supply actually also includes
theestimationerror.Hence,only“large”excessdemandshouldbetakenasan
indicator of a credit crunch.To get an impression what “large”in this context
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Excess demand respectively excess supply for loans to enterprises and self-employed persons
1992 to 2002;in % of credit supply
















ESSENmeans,in Figure 3 we depict a two standard error-band of this model,divided
by the average credit supply over the period of interest. In 1992/93, some ex-
cess-demand for loans is apparent.By that time,Germany was just about fall-
ing into a recession – speaking on itself for a weaker loan demand. On the
other hand,in that period,the German economy needed great amounts of li-
quidity for financing the huge investments in the five new Länder. This
extraordanaryhighdemandforcapitalmakestheundersupplyforcreditplau-
sible, although one has to bear in mind that the figures might be distorted by
theextremeexpansionoflendingintheyearsbefore(Figure1).Roughlysince
1999, the development reflects to a large degree the movements of share
prices. They rose quickly until reaching their all-time high in the first quarter
of 2000 and declining steadily afterwards.Since the fourth quarter of 2000,the
excess-supply for credit turned into over-demand lasting – with one short in-
terruption – until the end of 2002. Moreover, the situation deteriorates
quickly; since mid-2002 over-demand surpasses the two-standard error band
by large.It seems as if the credit crunch-scenario is valid.
16 Hiltrud Nehls and Torsten Schmidt
Estimates for credit demand and supply functions for different banking sectors
Maximum likelihood estimation











































































Sigma 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.037
Log Likelihood 128.11 136.83 216.99 204.69
Authors’ calculations.Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2
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ESSENOne of the stylised facts presented in Part 2 was a more pronounced drop of
credits in Großbanken than in the credit institutes excluding them. Scruti-
nising this finding,we apply specification (1) on the Großbanken and all other
credit institutions separately.10 Without further adjustment, both estimations
remain stable, all coefficients (apart from one constant term) keep their sign
(Table 2). However, the characteristics of the equations deteriorate to some
extent. The demand equations for both Großbanken and other banks loose
their cointegrating vectors; in particular loans from Großbanken seem to be
fully determined by supply, whereas calculated demand has no explanatory
power at all.In the light of this,comparing calculated demand with calculated
supply is not very informative. Nevertheless, the finding that the decline of
loansismainlydrivenbytheGroßbankenandthat–aspreviouslyprecluded–
this is a supply-driven development,further strengthens our results.
V. Conclusions
This paper analyses the recent developments for credit allocation in Germany
in order to evaluate the possibility that,at present,we are in the situation of a
creditcrunch.Weadoptadefinitionaccordingtowhichacreditcrunchassigns
a supply-side restriction of loans disregarding market interest rates and the
profitability of investment projects. Within the framework of a disequilib-
rium-model we establish a function for loan demand and one for loan supply.
The difference between estimated demand and estimated supply can be inter-
preted as an indicator of excess demand and excess supply respectively. We
find a substantial over-demand in the last two quarters,or,with interruptions,
since the beginning of 2001, substantiating the credit crunch-scenario. The
most important determinant explaining the unwillingness of the banks to lend
seemstobethestrongdeclineinprofits,associatedwiththelossesonthestock
market. Differentiating between banking groups, it is the Großbanken con-
ducting the most restrictive lending policy.
Our findings suggest that the slowdown in credit is not just a consequence of
the weak credit demand in Germany but it is also likely that the restrictive
lending policy of the banks is aggravating and prolongating the current eco-
nomic slump.The elemental consequence of a credit crunch is that profitable
investment projects are cancelled or delayed, dampening GDP growth di-
rectly, being a part of it, and indirectly by reducing the potential output. Our
approach does not allow for the evaluation of the macroeconomic effects re-
sulting from this credit crunch.It is likely that the magnitude of the effects de-
pendtoalargeextentonhowlongthissituationwillcontinueandwhetherthe
economywillenjoysomecatch-upeffectslateron.Thisleadstotheconclusion
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10 Weuseseparatedataonloans,sightdeposits,timedepositsandcapital.Theseries,adjustedfor
breaks are available at the Bundesbank.All other series are employed as described above.thatitwillbecrucialforthebusinesscycleinGermanythatthefinancialsitua-
tion in the banking sector improves quickly.With a consolidation of the stock
markets,partoftheproblemwillvanish.Hivingoffloansintosecuritisation,as
recently planned in the “true sales initiative” by a syndicate of thirteen Ger-
man banks,also might be a step into the right direction.
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Stationarity tests
1980 bis 2002
Variables 1980:1 to 2002:4 1992:1 to 2002:4
Real Lending to enterprises and self-employed persons
total –1.284** –1.514**
Großbanken –1.803** –0.790**
all other banks –1.177** –1.610**
Real GDP –0.398** –0.313**
Real Lending capacity
all banks 0.351** –0.521**
Großbanken 1.677** 0.108**
all other banks 2.454** –0.222**
Short-term loan rate –2.746** –2.577**
Interest rate spread –2.467** –2.188**
Long-term interest rate –1.742** –2.541**
Share price index –1.793** –1.337**
Authors’calculations.–ADF-Testwithconstantandnotrend.–**Thenullhypothesisofa




Johansen tests of cointegration between credit demand and supply














Großbanken Supply 0 29.21 1* 28.32 1*
1 0.89 1** 0.89 1**
Demand 0 7.10 0* 6.88 0*
1 0.22 0** 0.22 0**
Other banks Supply 0 18.77 2* 14.24 2*
1 4.52 1** 4.52 0**
Demand 0 11.85 0* 10.02 0*
1 1.83 0** 1.83 0**
Authors’ calculations. – Johansen Test of Cointegration assuming no deterministic trends
and no intercept in the cointegrating equation (CE) using one lag in first differences. The
trace test statistics are based on Reimers small-sample correction of the Johansen statistics
(Reimers 1992). – *Number of cointegrating equation(s) at the 5 % significance level. –
**Number of cointegrating equations at the 1 % significance level.
Table A2
RWI
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Specification (1) Supply 0 20.77 1* 19.09 1*
1 2.59 1** 2.72 1**
Demand 0 13.56 1* 14.24 1*
1 0.0001 0** 0.0002 0**
Specification (2) Supply 0 19.47 1* 17.68 1*
1 2.63 1** 2.76 1**
Demand 0 12.85 1* 11.55 1*
1 1.85 0** 1.94 0**
Specification (3) Supply 0 17.95 1* 16.21 1*
1 2.51 1** 2.64 1**
Demand 0 13.09 1* 13.75 1*
1 0.004 0** 0.004 0**
Specification (4) Supply 0 15.56 1* 13.40 1*
1 2.79 0** 2.93 0**
Demand 0 14.68 1* 15.39 1*
1 0.02 0** 0.02 0**
Specification (1) for
1980:1 to 2002:4
Supply 0 21.46 1* 20.96 1*
1 0.97 1** 0.99 1**
Demand 0 23.61 1* 20.88 1*
1 3.19 1** 3.26 1**
Authors’ calculations. – Johansen Test of Cointegration assuming no deterministic trends
and no intercept in the cointegrating equation (CE) using one lag in first differences. The
trace test statistics are based on Reimers small-sample correction of the Johansen statistics
(Reimers 1992). – *Number of cointegrating equation(s) at the 5 % significance level. –
**Number of cointegrating equations at the 1 % significance level.
Table A3
RWI
ESSEN